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Abstract
Distortionary income taxation in a standard New Keynesian model substantially
increases the nominal term-premium on long-term bonds relative to a model with lump-
sum taxes. Also the empirical level of the nominal term premium can be matched with
lower risk-aversion coe¢ cient in case of a model with income taxes relative to a model
with long-run ination risks.
Keywords: zero-coupon bond, nominal term premium, third-order approximation,
distortionary income taxation
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1 Introduction
Long-term nominal bonds deliver term-premium in order to compensate for future ination
and consumption risks the bond-holder has to bear. Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) make
use of a basic New Keynesian model and nds that the term premium can be large and
volatile. They assume the simplest scal scenario where government spending is nanced
with lump-sum taxes and decits are not allowed. Further they show that long-run ination
risks like uncertainty about the ination target substantially increase the term-premium.
Van Binsbergen et al. (2012) estimate a simplied version of the model in Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012) with Bayesian methods and points toward further investigation of the model
Emails: kaszabl@cf.ac.uk; ales.marsal@seznam.cz. We thank for the support of the Czech Academy
of Sciences (GACR P402/12/1993). Ales/Lorant is grateful for the hospitality of the European Central
Bank/Hungarian National Bank while writing this paper. We also thank for the comments we received in
Budapest, Cardi¤, Frankfurt and Prague.
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with a scal structure added. There are several empirical papers like Engen and Hubbard
(2004), Laubach (2003) and Canzoneri et al. (2002) who nd a positive connection between
decit and long-term bond yields using various econometric methods.
This paper proposes a simple alternative way to generate long-run ination risks. In
particular, we introduce distortionary income taxation into the model of Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012) and nd that the term premium on nominal bonds is higher than with lump-
sum taxes. Thus, scal policy provides another good reason why long-term nominal bonds
are risky. Further we show that the model with income taxation is able to generate the mean
level of the empirical nominal term premium with a risk-aversion coe¢ cient that is much
lower than the one needed in case of the model with long-run ination risks.
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) show that a basic New Keynesian model approximated
to the third order in the sense of Taylor series is able to generate large and volatile term
premium that is in line with US data. The term-premium is constant to the second order
while it becomes time-varying to the third-order. The only asset in their model is a default-
free government bond. These assets are risky as their real payo¤ covaries positively with
consumption. In particular, shocks that result in low consumption, high ination and, thus,
low real yields are important sources of the term premia. There are no liquidity risks in their
model.
The most important feature of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model are Epstein-Zin
preferences. Earlier papers in the literature considered preferences with consumption habits
(see, for instance, de Paoli et al. (2006) and the literature review in Rudebusch and Swanson
(2008)). With habits households are mainly concerned about sudden changes in consump-
tion. However, with Epstein-Zin preferences they are unhappy with changes in consumption
over medium and long horizons as well as short horizons. The household can o¤set short-run
changes in consumption by modifying its labor supply and savings (also known as precau-
tionary savings) but its ability to smooth consumption at medium- and long-run is much
more limited.
This paper departs from Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) who assume that government
spending is nanced by lump-sum taxes in each period. In their model there is no decit
allowed and, hence, no role for government debt. Below we show that allowing for government
debt change properties of the term-premium to a small extent if decit is nanced by lump-
sum taxes. As an alternative of lump-sum taxes we introduce distortionary taxation into
the Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model following Linnemann (2006) who postulates that
government collect revenue by levying the same tax rate on labor and prot income. When
government debt is paid back through income taxes the mean term-premium is substantially
higher than with lump-sum taxes and similar in magnitude to what can be obtained using
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the long-run ination risk version of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012). Also the t of the
model with our scal extension and the one with long-run ination risks relative to US data
are quite similar using the baseline calibration of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 is on cali-
bration and solution method. Section 3 provides details about the main results. The last
section concludes.
2 The model
The household maximises the continuation value of its utility (V ):
Vt =
(
U(Ct; Lt) + 

EtV
1 
t+1
 1
1  if U(Ct; Lt)  0
U(Ct; Lt)   [Et( Vt+1)1 ]
1
1  if U(Ct; Lt) < 0
(1)
with respect to its ow budget constraint.  is the discount factor. Utility (U) at period t is
derived from consumption (Ct) and leisure (1  Lt). As the time frame is normalised to one
leisure time (1   Lt) is what we are left with after spending some time working (Lt). The
recursive functional form in equation (1) is called Epstein-Zin preferences and is the same
as the one used by Rudebusch and Swanson (2012). To be consistent with balanced growth
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) imposes the following functional form on U :
U(Ct; Lt) =
C1 't
1  ' + 0Z
1 '
t
L1 t
1  ; ',  > 0:
where Zt is an aggregate productivity trend and ', , 0 > 0. The intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (IES) is 1=' and the Frisch labor supply elasticity is given by (1   l)=l
where l is the steady-state of hours worked. Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) derives the
following relationship between coe¢ cient of relative risk-aversion (CRRA) and the curvature
parameter  in the recursive utility (1):
CRRA =
'
1 + '

+ 
1  '
1 + 1 '
1 
1 l
l
:
Nominal term premium on a long-term bond, say a 10 year-bond, is computed as the
return on the risky 10-year bond minus the return on a bond that is rolled over 10 years.
The yield on the latter strategy is often called as risk-neutral yield which is consistent with
the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. The nominal term premium cannot be
observed empirically. Therefore, we also calculate alternative measures of the term premium
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like the mean and standard deviation of slope of the term structure and excess holding period
returns that are observable.
The intermediary rm produces output (Yt) using the technology:
Yt = At[Kt]
1 [ZtLt], 0 <  < 1
whereKt = Ztk is the aggregate capital stock (k is xed),  is the share of labor in production
and At is a stationary aggregate productivity shock:
logAt = A logAt 1 + "
A
t ,
where "At is an independently and identically distributed (iid) stochastic technology shock
with mean zero and variance 2A.
Intermediary rms which maximise their prots face price-setting frictions of Calvo style.
With Calvo frictions a 1  fraction of rms can set its price optimally in each period. Based
on this we can derive the New Keynesian Phillips curve that establishes log-linear connection
between ination rate (^t) and the real marginal cost (cmct)1:
^t = ~Et^t+1 + cmct. (2)
where ^t  log(t=), cmct  log(mct=mc). t and mct are de-trended ination rate and real
marginal cost i.e. t  t=Zt and mct  MCt=Zt, respectively. The parameter  > 0 is
an inverse function of ,  and " which is the elasticity of substitution among intermediary
goods. Variables without a time index denote steady-states. ~ stands for the discount factor
that is corrected by the growth rate () of the productivity trend (Zt) i.e.  '.
Intermediary products are bundled into a nal product through a Dixit-Stiglitz aggrega-
tor. Bundlers are perfectly competitive rms.
The New-Keynesian model is closed by a monetary policy rule (so called Taylor rule):
Rt = Rt 1 + (1  )[R + log t + g(log t   log t ) + gy(Yt   Y t )=Y t ] + "it
where Rt is the policy rate, t is a four-quarter moving average of ination and Y t is the
trend level of output yZt (where y denotes the steady-state level of Yt=Zt ). t is the target
rate of ination, "it is an iid shock with mean zero and variance 
2
i . In the baseline version
of the Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model without long-run ination-risks the ination
target is constant (t = 
 for all t).
1Here we use the log-linear version of the Phillips curve for illustration purposes the model is solved using
the Phillips curve in its non-linear form.
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The four-quarter moving average of ination (t) can be approximated by a geometric
moving average of ination:
log t =  log t + (1  ) log t, (3)
where the choice of  = 0:7 ensures that the geometric average in equation (3) has an
e¤ective duration of about four quarters.
In the long-run ination risk version of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model they make
the ination target stochastic:
t = 



t 1 + #(t   t ) + "

t , # > 0, "

t > 0,
where "

t is an iid ination target shock with mean zero and variance 
2
.
Note that in this paper we set # =  = "

t = 0 when considering di¤erent sorts of
scal scenarios.
The government spending follows the process:
log(gt=g) = G log(gt 1=g) + "
G
t , 0 < G < 1,
where g is the steady-state level of gt  Gt=Zt, and "Gt is an iid shock with mean zero and
variance 2G.
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) assume that government spending is nanced through
lump-sum taxes in each period i.e. government budget is balanced. Instead, we can allow
for decit that is retired through lump-sum taxes:
bt + tt =
 1rt 1bt 1
t
+ gt (4)
where bt, tt, rt and t stand for the de-trended government debt, lump-sum taxes, short-term
nominal interest rate and ination, respectively. All quantities are expressed as real except
for the nominal interest rate (rt). rt 1bt 1 are interest-payments on the previous period debt.
If one imposes the restriction of bt = bt 1 = 0 for all t expression (4) boils down to the case
of balanced budget (gt = tt for all t).
The tax rule in case of lump-sum taxes is given by:
tt =  
 1bt 1
where  2 (0; 2) ensures that scal policy is passive in the sense of Leeper (1991). When  
is set to be close to zero debt is paid back in the very long-run. By contrast a coe¢ cient of
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 close to two roughly mimics the case of balanced budget.
An alternative way to retire government debt is through income tax revenue ( tyt):
bt +  tyt =
 1rt 1bt 1
t
+ gt: (5)
where  t is the income tax rate. yt is the de-trended level of output that equals to the sum
of prot and labor income which are taxed at the same rate.
The tax revenue rule for the latter case is given by:
 tyt =  
 1bt 1: (6)
To observe the role of steady-state debt we linearise equation (5) to the rst-order:
b^t + d t +  y^t = 
 1(bdrt 1 + rb^t 1   br^t) + g^t (7)
where b^t  (bt  b)=y, d t   t   , drt  rt  r, y^t  (yt y)=y , g^t  (gt g)=y and b is the
government debt-to-GDP ratio. Variables without a time index denote steady-state values.
Note that the deviations of debt and government spending from their respective steady-states
is dened relative to the steady-state output, which is standard in the literature (see, e.g.,
Linnemann (2006)). When steady-state debt is zero i.e. b = 0 real interest rate (drt 1 rt)
does not have a direct e¤ect on taxes (d t). More intuition is provided below.
Finally we note that goods and labor markets clear in equilibrium and the transversality
condition regarding the bond-holdings is satised.
3 Calibration and solution method
Calibration can be found in Table (1) that follow the baseline parameter values of Rudebusch
and Swanson (2012). The coe¢ cient in the lump-sum tax rule ( ) is the one of Corsetti et
al. (2012). Unlike Linnemann (2006) who linearises his model to the rst-order we make
use of the tax-rule in its non-linear form so that  is needed to pin down the steady-state
tax rate which is given by  = ((1=)(b=y)(1=) + g=y)=(1 + = ). The quarterly steady-
state debt-to-GDP ratio (b=y) of sixty per cent is based on Rossi (2012). As a baseline we
set  = 0:12 so that the steady-state tax rate is 0:2767 which is slightly higher than that
of Linnemann (2006)2. The whole model is approximated to the third order using Dynare
(Adjemian et al. 2011) in Matlab when calculating all the moments in table (2) and (3).
To speed up calculations for gure (1) we used second-order approximation as unconditional
2The choice of  = 0:02 implies a steady-state tax rate of less than 1 percent that is empirically implausible.
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means unlike standard deviations are quite similar in magnitude for second- and third-
order approximations.
4 Results
Figure (1) shows that there is positive linear relationship between the risk-aversion coe¢ cient
and mean of the nominal term premium. The straight line reproduces the baseline model of
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) without debt and long-run risks. The introduction of debt
into the baseline model with lump-sum taxes raises the term-premium (see dashed line). The
baseline model with long-run risks is depicted with dots. The model with debt and income
taxes are demonstrated for two di¤erent values of the coe¢ cient in the policy rule,  (see
the circles and diamonds). One can see that the extension of the Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012) model with debt and distortionary taxes generates a term-premium close to the one
obtained with long-run risks for both values of  . When taxation is distortionary the curve
is steeper than with lump-sum taxes implying higher ination/real risks in case of income
taxation.
Binsbergen et al. (2012) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) show that a DSGE model
successfully replicates several properties of the term-structure when consumption growth and
ination are negatively correlated contemporaneously and forecast each other with a negative
sign. The Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model features temporary productivity shocks in
order to generate the previous patterns. In particular, a temporary negative shock to produc-
tivity leads to a fall in consumption and an increase in ination due to the rise in marginal
cost. As a result, nominal bonds carry positive term premia as depressed consumption is
associated with a time of low real bond yields due to higher ination.
Our scal extension with income taxation has the implication similar to that of produc-
tivity shocks. To shed light on the mechanism let us study what happens after a positive
innovation to government spending that needs to be nanced sooner ( is close to two) or
later ( is close to zero) with income taxes. Higher taxes on income imply less hours worked
and lower output because households substitute away from labor to leisure. Also higher in-
come taxes means higher real marginal cost and higher ination through the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (see equation (2)). The e¤ect of the previous channel is magnied by positive
steady-state debt (see b > 0 in equation (7)) establishing direct connection between taxes
and real interest rate which surely rises after a stimulative shock according to the logic of the
Taylor rule to curb ination expectations (Linnemann, 2006). It would be of interest to test
the signicance of the size of the steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio. However, it is impractical
to carry out an experiment with zero steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio because this would
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result in a steady-state tax rate that is extremely low (around 1.8 percent).
Table (2) summarises means and standard deviations of selected macro and nance vari-
ables using the baseline calibration of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012). Note that the mean
value of the nominal term premium is very similar across the four versions of the baseline
model. Regarding the standard deviations of nance variables it is the model with ination
risks that ts the data best. With the introduction of lump-sum taxes and endogenous debt
(column three) we improve upon the performance of the baseline model. The macro and
nance moments derived using the model with long-run ination risks (column four) and the
one with scal extension (column ve) are roughly similar. The moments reported in column
one (called RS) are directly comparable with those in Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
We note that the standard deviations of macro and nance moments in column one (called
RS) are slightly lower than those of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012, pp. 124, column 3 of
table 2) for at least two reasons. First, they calculate theoretical moments while we obtain
simulated moments. Second, they use a numerical precision of 90 digits available in software
Mathematica while we have only sixteen digits available in Matlab.
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) decrease their baseline values of IES and Frisch elasticity
and increase the CRRA parameter in order to match US data3. A lower IES means that
households dislike changes in consumption over time more than with a higher IES. A lower
Frisch elasticity implies that households are less able to use their labor supply to o¤set
negative shocks to consumption. As a consequence consumption stream is more volatile
for relatively low values of IES and Frisch elasticity. Also a higher risk-aversion coe¢ cient
represents that households are more concerned about changes in future consumption ow
and, therefore, require higher compensation in order to hold risky bonds whose real return
co-moves positively with the consumption stream.
In Table (3) we lower the IES from 0.5 to 0.09 and the Frisch elasticity from 2/3 to 0.28
leaving other parameters at the level of the baseline calibration. The risk-aversion coe¢ cient
of 106 is chosen so that the model with scal policy can match a nominal term premium
of 1.06 inferred from US data. Indeed after a reduction in the values of IES and Frisch
elasticity the macro and nance variables exhibit higher standard deviations. Still some of
the simulated moments like the standard deviation of the excess holding period return and
the slope for a 10-year bond (denoted by SD(x(40)) and SD(R(40) R) respectively) are below
the corresponding US data.
3To be precise, Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) change not only the IES and Frisch parameters when they
consider their best-t experiments but also properties of the stochastic processes and duration of the price
rigidity. Instead, here, we focus only on changes in the IES, Frisch and CRRA parameters whose e¤ects are
well documented in the literature (see, e.g., van Binsbergen et al. (2012)). de Paoli et al. (2006) describes
how a shorter duration of price rigidity raises the term-premium. However, we do not intend to deviate from
the price-stickiness of a duration of 4 quarters on average (this is the baseline calibration).
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Also importantly, the model with scal policy produces a mean of the nominal term
premium (1.06) that is higher than the one with ination-risks (0.72). The version of the
model with ination risks is able to generate the empirical mean of the term premium (1.06)
only if the risk-aversion coe¢ cient is 155. Thus, it follows that a particular level of the
average nominal term premium can be achieved with lower CRRA using the scal extension
compared to the ination risk alternative. However, it is also true that the ination-risk
model performs better in terms of matching standard deviations of US data.
5 Conclusion
Fiscal policy can be an important source of long-run nominal risks in the sense that nominal
term premium on government bonds rises substantially when spending is nanced through
income taxes relative to lump-sum taxes. Also employing the model with income taxes we can
match the empirical level of the nominal term premium with lower risk-aversion coe¢ cient
than the one needed in case of the model with long-run ination risks. In a companion paper
we augment the above model with physical capital as in de Paoli et al. (2006) and nd our
main message to be robust.
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Table 1: Calibration
 1.0025 ' 2 i 0.73 A .95
~ 0.99  3 g 0.53 G .95
 0.02 CRRA 75 gy 0.93 2A 0.005
2
l 1/3  2/3  1 2G 0.005
2
K=Y 10  0.2  0.99  0.12
G=Y 0.17  0.75 2 .0005
2 b 2.4
" 6 # 0.01
where G=Y is the government spending-GDP ratio, K=Y is the share of xed capital in GDP,
 is the depreciation rate of xed capital. The rest of the parameters are explained above.
Figure 1: The relationship between the coe¢ cient of relative risk-aversion (CRRA) and the
mean of the nominal term premium using di¤erent versions of the Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012) (=RS) model.
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Table 2: Moments from variants of the Rudebusch and Swanson (=RS) (2012) model com-
pared to US data
Unconditional US data, RS RS with debt RS with RS with debt and
Moment 1996-2007 and lump-sum taxes long-run risks* income taxes
SD(C) 0.83 1.42 1.46 1.35 1.49
SD(L) 1.71 1.5 1.54 1.44 1.46
SD(W) 0.82 1.32 1.32 1.35 1.21
SD() 2.52 1.64 1.64 2.11 1.86
SD(R) 2.71 1.6 1.61 2.01 1.76
SD(Rreal) 2.30 0.93 0.93 0.98 0.98
SD (R(40)) 2.41 0.85 0.85 1.33 0.95
Mean(NTP (40)) 1.06 0.39 0.4 0.42 0.44
SD(NTP (40)) 0.54 0.04 0.04 0.1 0.05
Mean(R(40)  R) 1.43 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.49
SD(R(40)  R) 1.33 0.9 0.89 0.87 0.96
Mean(x(40)) 1.76 0.69 0.72 0.81 0.79
SD(x(40)) 23.43 7.81 7.98 10.14 8.88
where SD=standard deviation, NTP (40)=nominal term premium on a 40-quarter bond,
Mean=Unconditional Mean, R(40)   R is the slope and x(40) is the excess holding period
return for a 40-quarter bond. Each version of the models listed above utilises the baseline
calibration of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) that does not t macro and nance moments
of US data (neither here nor in their paper).
*Note that the results in this column are obtained using the baseline calibration of RS while
they provide results using their best-t calibration (see column 3 of table 3 on pp. 136
in Rudebusch and Swanson (2012)). In this paper we deem it important to compare the
performance of the long-run ination risk version with other versions making use of the
baseline calibration of RS.
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Table 3: Moments from variants of the Rudebusch and Swanson (=RS) (2012) model com-
pared to US data
Unconditional US data, RS with RS with debt
Moment 1996-2007 long-run risks and income taxes
SD(C) 0.83 0.44 0.65
SD(L) 1.71 1.41 1.83
SD(W) 0.82 2.77 2.35
SD() 2.52 2.57 2.20
SD(R) 2.71 2.24 2.42
SD(Rreal) 2.30 1.55 1.42
SD (R(40)) 2.41 1.92 1.51
Mean(NTP (40)) 1.06 0.72 1.06
SD(NTP (40)) 0.54 0.57 0.25
Mean(R(40)  R) 1.43 0.79 0.68
SD(R(40)  R) 1.33 1.13 1.25
Mean(x(40)) 1.76 1.41 2.01
SD(x(40)) 23.43 16.18 14.58
In this table we used CRRA = 106, Frisch = 0:28 and IES = 0:09. The rest of the
parameters follow the baseline calibration of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
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